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Abstract
This article presents the main issues relating to the goals of modern Polish competition 
law. It examines the relationship between the subject-matter of competition law, its 
function and its goals. It identifies various goals of competition law as well as their 
acceptance in the legal doctrine and jurisprudence. The study shows that the goals 
of Polish competition law have always been limited to enhancing efficiency and 
consumer welfare, with this latter term being understood in a post-Chicago-school 
fashions, rather than accordingly to its Chicago-school origin. This article shows 
how an 18-years competition law system, rather accidentally than deliberately, 
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took the best ideas from both the American and the European legal tradition and 
mix them up into an incoherent, yet workable system of competition protection 
which is favourable towards efficient operations and, at the same time, safeguards 
consumers against exploitation and diminished choice.
Classifications and key words: competition, goals, public interest, efficiency, 
consumer protection, consumer welfare, competitor, economic freedom, restriction 
of competition.
I. Introduction 
Without a doubt, competition law statutes around the world have one thing 
in common – their substantive rules are drafted in a language so general and 
imprecise that they resemble far more the provisions of constitutional law1, 
than those of any other coherent body of law. Leaving any interpreter with one 
of the widest possible margins of discretion, this generality allows substantive 
provisions of antitrust law to remain unchanged for hundreds (US), a few 
dozen (EC) or several years (Poland) seeing as its rules may easily be adapted 
to changing economic, political and social circumstances and, of course, legal 
or economic concepts. The core rules remain unchanged yet their application 
evolves with time. How is it possible that the same provision, the same semantic 
structure, is understood and applied in a substantially different way? How can 
it be that the same conduct was first perceived as anticompetitive, then as 
procompetitive and it is now, in turn, viewed with caution? The answer to 
these questions, and indeed many others, lies in the goals of competition law. 
They influence the way the law in books becomes the law in action. It is the 
goals of competition law rather than its statutory provisions that determine 
which conduct is prohibited, which practice is allowed and how and when 
can a conduct find approval? Differences in goals are also responsible for 
divergent applications of identical, or highly similar, rules contained in various 
legal systems.2
Goals of competition law are rarely defined in statutory provisions. Even if 
they are, the room for interpretation is still great. Any references made to the 
goals of competition law are vague and can be understood in a great variety 
of ways. These goals can also be reflected in their country’s legislative history, 
in the wording of their statutory prohibitions and in the economic and legal 
1  Pointed out by the US Supreme Court as early as the judgment delivered in Appalachian 
Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 359–60 (1933).
2  R. Whish, Competition law, Oxford 2001, p. 16.Vol. 2008, 1(1)
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doctrine. However, case-law remains the most important source of information 
concerning the goals of competition law seeing as it is cases that illustrate how 
the bodies responsible for the enforcement of competition law understand the 
scope of its prohibitions. Case-law determines which conduct restricts and 
which does not restrict competition as well as what circumstances are to be 
taken into account in a competition-related analysis. Even a localised lack of 
interest in a particular market practice shown by competition law enforcement 
bodies can be indicative of the goals of antitrust.
The purpose of this study is to examine the goals of modern Polish 
competition law. Its history began in 1990 with the entry into force of the Act 
of 24 February 1990 on Counteracting Monopolistic Practices and Protection 
of Consumers (hereafter, the Act of 1990)3. It has been subsequently repealed 
by the Act of 15 December 2000 on Competition and Consumer Protection 
(hereafter, the Act of 2000)4 which was in turn replaced by the Act of 16 
February 2007 on Competition and Consumer Protection (hereafter, the 
Act of 2007)5. These legislative changes have not resulted in any substantial 
modifications of the objectives pursued by Polish competition law6. This study 
does not cover the cartel regulations of 1930s7 due to lack of continuity in the 
legal tradition nor, for reasons related to the economy, the Antimonopoly Act 
of 19878.
II. The subject-matter, the function and goals of competition law
Before examining the goals of Polish competition law, three interrelated yet 
separate concepts have to be identified that are often used interchangeably 
in this context, which leads to confusion between the object and the purpose 
of competition law. 
Competition law (antitrust law) consists of a set of legal rules that protect 
the existence of competition seen here as the mechanism that regulates the 
3  Act of 24 February 1990 on Counteracting Monopolistic Practices and Consumer Protection 
(consolidated text: Journal of Laws 1997 No 49, item 318 with amendments).
4  Act of 15 December 2000 on Competition and Consumer Protection (consolidated text: 
Journal of Laws 2005 No 244, item 2080 with amendments).
5  Journal of Laws 2007 No 50, item 331, with amendments.
6  Judgment of the Supreme Court of 24 July 2003, I CKN 496/01, UOKiK Official Journal 
2004, No 1, item 283.
7  Act of 28 March 1933 on Cartels, Journal of Laws 1933, No 31, item 270 and Act of 13 
July 1939 on Cartel Agreements, Journal of Laws 1939, No 63, item 418.
8  Act of 28 January 1987 on counteracting monopolistic practices in national economy, 
Journal of Laws 1987 No 3, item 18.YEARBOOK of ANTITRUST and REGULATORY STUDIES
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functioning of the markets9. The subject-matter of competition law is the 
regulation of economic conduct of undertakings through a set of prohibitions. 
These are directed towards such business practices which are harmful to 
the competitive process itself10. Competition law does not care about the 
quality of the competitive process, which lies in the domain of the law on 
unfair competition that determines the prohibited methods of market rivalry. 
Competition law is also not interested in market distortions resulting form 
state interventions taking the form of various subsidies that are damaging to 
the equality of competition. This is the subject-matter of state-aid rules.
The function of competition law is the protection of competition against 
distortions resulting from the behavior of professional market participants, that 
is, undertakings. Competition, the preservation of competition, competition 
restraint etc. can be understood differently depending on the goals to be 
achieved through competition law. The goals of competition law explain why 
competition is protected, as well as why are certain practices considered to be 
anticompetitive or procompetitive. It is the goals of competition law that form 
the background of decisions based on its substantive provisions because they 
determine their interpretation and application. The function of competition law 
is constant and identical for all legal systems that encompass it. Competition is 
and should be protected because it is beneficial for consumers, the economy 
and therefore for the whole society. In contrast, the goals (objectives) of 
competition law are various and differ among jurisdictions11, because a wide 
variety of benefits is associated with competition, ranging from socio-political 
to purely economic12.
A quick look at the opinions expressed by Polish scholars shows a variety 
of views on this issue. They range from the protection of the constitutional 
freedom of economic activity13 to consumer interests and welfare (albeit not 
 9  For definitions of competition (antitrust) law see also A. Jurkowska, Porozumienia 
kooperacyjne w świetle wspólnotowego i polskiego prawa ochorny konkurencji. Od formalizmu do 
ekonomizacji, Warszawa 2005, p. 34.
10  This is often referred to as protection of the freedom of competition, see M. Stefaniuk, 
Publicznoprawne reguły konkurencji, Lublin 2005, p. 14.
11  For an outline of potential objectives, which may be pursued by competition law see 
R. Whish, Competition…, p. 15–19; L. A. Sullivan, W. Grimes, The law of antitrust…, p. 9–16; 
V. Korah, An introductory guide to EC competition law and practice, Oxford 2004, p. 9–17; K. Cseres, 
Competition law and consumer protection, The Hague, p. 244-306; M. Monti, EC competition law, 
Cambridge 2007; p. 20–52; D. Miąsik, Reguła rozsądku w prawie antymonopolowym. Studium 
prawnoporównawcze, Zakamycze 2004, p. 41–52.
12  E. Kosiński, Rodzaje i zakres sektorowych wyłączeń zastosowania ogólnych reguł ochrony 
konkurencji, Poznań 2007, p. 50.
13  Z. Jurczyk, “Cele polityki antymonopolowej w teorii i praktyce” [in:] C. Banasiński, 
E. Stawicki (eds), Konkurencja w gospodarce współczesnej, Warszawa 2007, p. 36.Vol. 2008, 1(1)
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within the meaning adopted by the Chicago-School)14, separated in the middle 
by the approach pursued by the Harvard-School15 and the concept of economic 
efficiency16, including allocative efficiency considered to be the sole objective 
of competition law17. 
A quick look at Polish jurisprudence shows a state of almost total chaos 
when it comes to the topic of this paper. The aforementioned notions of 
the subject-matter, the function and the goals of competition law have been 
used quite freely, and totally interchangeably, to provide a background for 
particular decisions and judgments that should have been in fact determined 
with reference to the goals of competition law only. 
In some cases reference to the content of Article 1 of the Act of 1990, of 
the Act of 2000 and of the Act 2007 was repeated (protection of competition, 
undertakings and consumers)18. In those instances, the subject-matter, the 
function and the goals of competition law were mixed up. In other cases, 
statements can be found that the purpose of competition law is “to secure 
conditions for the development of competition” and “to secure the protection 
of consumer rights”19, even though the first purpose reflects the function of 
competition law while the second purpose is to general. This is followed by 
cases containing statements that the goal of competition law is to protect 
market competition seen as an “institutional phenomenon” which is the basis 
of free market economy20. Other examples include declarations pursuant to 
which “the good protected under the act is the existence of competition as 
the atmosphere in which economic activity is conducted” while the protection 
14  D. Miąsik, Reguła…, p. 429.
15  E. Modzelewska-Wąchal, Ustawa o ochronie konkurencji i konsumentów. Komentarz, 
Warszawa 2002, s. 10.
16  K. Kohutek, [in:] K. Kohutek, M. Sieradzka, Ustawa o ochronie konkurencji i kon  sumentów. 
Komentarz, Warszawa 2008, p. 43; Z. Jurczyk, “Cele polityki…”, p. 36.
17  E. Kosiński, “Cele i instrumenty antymonopolowej interwencji państwa w gospo  darkę” 
(2004) 3 Kwartalnik Prawa Publicznego 40–41.
18  Judgment of the Supreme Court of 24 July 2003, I CKN 496/01, UOKiK Official Journal 
2004, No 1, item 283.
19  Judgment of the Supreme Court of 24 May 2004, III SK 41/04, (2005) 13 Orzecznictwo 
Sądu Najwyższego – Izba Pracy, Ubezpieczeń Społecznych i Spraw Publicznych, item 199; judgment 
of the Supreme Court of 10 May 2007, III SK 24/06, (2008) 9–10 Orzecznictwo Sądu Najwyższego 
– Izba Pracy, Ubezpieczeń Społecznych i Spraw Publicznych, item 152.
20  Decision of the President of UOKIK of 4 July 2008, DOK-3/2008; decision of the President 
of UOKIK of 31 December 2007, DOK-99/2007; decision of the President of UOKIK of 7 April 
2008, DOK-1/2008; decision of the President of UOKIK of 7 April 2008, DOK-1/2008; Judgment 
of the Antimonopoly Court of 5 December 2001, XVII Ama 8/01, Lex 56500; judgment of 
the Antimonopoly Court of 27 June 2001, XVII Ama 92/00, Lex 55944, judgment of the 
Antimonopoly Court of 6 June 2001, XVII Ama 78/00, Lex 56162; judgment of the Court of 
Competition and Consumer Protection of 22 February 2003, XVII Ama 3/02, unpublished.YEARBOOK of ANTITRUST and REGULATORY STUDIES
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of consumers (as purchasers of goods and services offered under competitive 
conditions) is executed “by the way”21. Statements can even be found that 
“the task of the antimonopoly authorities and antitrust law is to lead to a total 
(unlimited) and effective competition on the relevant market”22. Sometimes 
the competition authority and the courts seem to follow the approach pursued 
by the Harvard school considering “the operation on the market of many 
independent undertakings, offering their products to consumers at a different 
price, quality and quantity” to be a prerequisite for competition. “Only if such 
market conditions are met can a consumer, by making a choice, influence 
the conduct of undertakings rewarding those, whose offers are beneficial for 
consumers and eliminating those, who are not competitive”.
Referencing preparatory materials is not very helpful either. For example, 
the Government’s draft of the 2007 Act was justified as follows “the act is an 
effective instrument of competition protection” (p. 1) and “basic goals of the 
act are the protection of undertakings and consumers in the public interest” 
(p. 4). This fact clearly shows that even the legislator does not really know: 
why is the regulation of competition protection desired? Why is competition 
protected? And, what goals should be achieved through competition law? 
One of the most interesting issues surrounding competition law and the 
economic order, namely, to identify, to describe and to execute the goals 
of competition law is thus left to the bodies responsible for enforcing the 
substantive provisions of competition law and to the legal doctrine. 
III. In search of guidance – the title and the preamble 
For EU lawyers, it is quite natural to refer to preambles of European 
regulations or directives in search of guidance as to the intentions behind a 
specific piece of legislation. However, preambles are not common in the Polish 
legal tradition. Therefore, the fact that the Act of 1990 contained a preamble, 
which preceded its substantive provisions, emphasised the importance attributed 
to competition law in a country undergoing an economic and legal transition. 
Although not binding, the preamble was considered to be an important source 
of inspiration for the competition authority and courts, and was considered 
to be capable of influencing the interpretation of the substantive provisions 
21  Judgment of the Court of Competition and Consumer Protection of 16 November 2005, 
XVII Ama 97/04, published in: UOKiK Official Journal 2006, No 1, item 16.
22  Decision of the President of the UOKIK of 10 October 2005, DOK-127/2005.Vol. 2008, 1(1)
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of this Act23. The preamble spoke of the following “goals”: 1) securing 
the development of competition, 2) the protection of undertakings against 
monopolistic practices and, 3) the protection of consumer interests.
The wording of the preamble suggested that all three goals were of equal 
importance. However, it was established early on that the first “goal” was 
of most importance, even though it is clear that the first “goal” listed in the 
preamble was not really a goal but rather, a legislative description of the 
function of the Act24. Contrary to what is generally considered to be the 
main function of competition law (“the protection of competition”), the 
wording of the preamble signified that, to an economy moving away from 
state-control and towards the free-market, the creation and maintenance of 
a competitive environment was of greatest importance25. Putting aside the 
character of this phrase, “securing the development of competition” could 
have been understood as directing the activities of the competition authority 
against companies holding large market shares (strong market positions) since 
limiting their activities through the intervention of competition authorities 
led to the opening of markets for new entrants. This, in turn, implies that 
the prohibitions stipulated in the Act of 1990 should be applied against 
those practices which were directed against the competitive structure of the 
market26. At the time when the Act of 1990 was adopted, the economy was 
dominated by state-, or formerly state-owned enterprises, which were not 
used to competitive pressure. In such circumstances, the emphasis put on the 
development of competition allowed the markets to be freed and competition 
to be introduced as the main driving force of the economy. The development 
of competition meant an increase in the available offers27 and, in turn, forced 
existing market operators to act more efficiently to satisfy consumer needs28. 
23  S. Gronowski, Ustawa antymonopolowa – komentarz, Warszawa 1999, p. 22; D. Miąsik, 
Reguła rozsądku…, p. 363; Judgment of the Antimonopoly Court of 11 December 1996, XVII 
Ama 59/96, LEX no 56166; judgment of the Supreme Court of 29 May 2001, I CKN 1217/98, 
(2002) 1 Orzecznictwo Sądu Najwyższego – Izba Cywilna, item 13.
24  S. Gronowski, Ustawa…, p. 19; T. Skoczny, “Dostosowanie prawa polskiego do prawa 
wspólnotowego w zakresie materialnego prawa antymonopolowego” [in:] P. Saganek, T. Skoczny 
(eds), Wybrane problemy dostosowania prawa polskiego do prawa Unii Europejskiej, Warszawa 
1999, p. 146; D. Miąsik, Reguła rozsądku…, p. 363; judgment of the Antimonopoly Court of 
26 September 1990, XV Amr 1/90, (1992) 1 Wokanda; Judgment of the Antimonopoly Court 
of 29 December 1993 r., XVII Amr 42/93, (1994) 5 Wokanda; Judgment of the Antimonopoly 
Court of 24 January 1991, XV Amr 8/90, (1992) 2 Wokanda.
25  D. Miąsik, Reguła rozsądku…, p. 364.
26  A Fornalczyk, “Competition law and policy in Poland in 1990–95” [in:] T. Skoczny 
(ed.), Harmonisation of the polish competition legislation with competition rules of the European 
Communities, summary and recommendations, Warszawa 1997, p. 37.
27  T. Skoczny, Dostosowanie…, p. 146.
28  I. Wiszniewska, Granice kartelowo-prawne licencji patentowych, Wrocław 1990, p. 50.YEARBOOK of ANTITRUST and REGULATORY STUDIES
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There was no other way to force efficiency on undertakings that were used to 
operating in a state-controlled economy characterised by severe shortages of 
all commodities and most of the services.
However, this is only one possible reading of the first and most important 
goal of the Act of 1990. It would be equally correct to understand the phrase 
“securing the development of competition” as meaning that not only should 
the markets be kept open for all potential entrants, but that the rivalry 
among independent undertakings and freedom of economic activity are the 
key concepts connected to the development of competition. This alternative 
approach finds supports in the second goal of this Act, that is, “the protection 
of undertakings against monopolistic practices” (here the term “goals” was 
used correctly). One may be tempted to consider this part of the preamble to 
suggest that the competition authority had the duty to protect the interests of 
undertakings. This falls short of protecting competitors against competition. 
However, the preamble warranted undertakings with protection through the 
intervention of the competition authority only to the extent, to which the harm 
to their economic interests resulted from anticompetitive practices and not 
from competition itself29. This, in turn, supports the thesis that the protection 
of competitors has never been considered as one of the legislative goals of 
Polish competition law.
The last of the goals of the Act of 1990 stipulated in its preamble referred 
to the protection of consumer interests. Similarly to safeguarding the interests 
of undertakings, consumers were protected only against anticompetitive 
practices. However, referral to consumer interests may indicate that the 
conduct of undertakings should be assed in the light of its impact on this 
group of market participants. If consumer protection was to be taken into 
consideration when applying the substantive provisions of the Act of 1990, 
what was bad for consumers ought to restrict competition, while what was 
good for them should not generally be prohibited. It was also suggested that 
consumer needs may only be satisfied by efficient undertakings30 and that their 
interests may only be harmed through the exercise of market power31. 
In contrast to the Act of 1990, neither the Act of 2000 nor the Act of 2007 
has a preamble. Both Acts share the same title (“Act on competition and 
consumer protection”) which suggests that they were intended to perform 
two functions: protect competition and protect consumers. It is difficult to 
ascertain what role should the protection of consumers play within the ambit 
of antitrust rules contained in the act. Among the duties of the competition 
29  D. Miąsik, Reguła rozsądku…, p. 365.
30  I. Wiszniewska, Granice…, p. 50.
31  M. Tadeusiak, “Competition and consumer protection on monopolized markets in the light 
of antimonopolistic decisions in 1990–1995” [in:] T. Skoczny (ed.), Harmonisation…, p. 75.Vol. 2008, 1(1)
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authority lays the protection of consumers against practices infringing their 
collective interests (due to the implementation of the EC Directive 98/27). 
However, a reference to consumer protection was made already in the original 
version of the Act of 2000, before the implementation of the 98/27 Directive. 
The title of both Acts suggests therefore that consumer interests may play 
an important role in the application of the substantive antitrust prohibitions 
stipulated in both acts, thus influencing the goals of Polish competition law.
IV. The role of the public interest 
An important role in determining the goals of Polish competition law has 
been played by the concept of “public interest”. It has been consistently held 
that the substantive provisions of the Act of 1990, the Act of 2000 and the Act 
of 2007 may only be applied whet the conduct under examination harms not 
merely an individual, but public interest. 
Initially, the Act of 1990 did not mention the public interest. However, in 
one of its first judgments, the Antimonopoly Court declared that “only those 
cases may be examined under the provisions of the act which infringe the 
public interest in the development of competition, protection of undertaking 
and consumer interest against anticompetitive practices”32. The development 
of this doctrine lead to the creation of a new substantive condition that had 
to be met when applying the provisions of the 1990 Act namely that the 
competition authority was obliged to determine and explain how the conduct 
under investigation infringed, or threatened to infringe, the public interest33. 
Reference to the public interest can be found in Article 1 of the Act of 2000 
as well as the Act of 2007.
What derives from the case-law based on the application of the Act of 1990 
is that a harm to the public interest could be found where “the harmful effects 
of the conduct violating the Antimonopoly Act were felt by a wider number of 
market participants”34, sometimes supported by a more general statement – “or 
32  Judgment of the Antimonopoly Court of 24 January 1991, Amr 8/90, (1992) 
2 Wokanda. 
33  Judgment of the Antimonopoly Court of 3 August 1994, XVII Amr 15/94, (1995) 5 
Wokanda; judgment of the Antimonopoly Court of 6 June 2001, XVII Ama 78/00, Lex no 
56162. 
34  Judgment of the Antimonopoly Court of 29 December 1993, XVII Amr 42/93, (1994) 
5 Wokanda, p. 56; judgment of the Supreme Court of 29 May 2001, I CKN 1271/98, (2002) 
1 Orzecznictwo Sądu Najwyższego – Izba Cywilna, item 13; judgment of the Supreme Court 
of 28 January 2002, I CKN 112/99, (2002) 11 Orzecznictwo Sądu Najwyższego – Izba Cywilna, 
item 144.YEARBOOK of ANTITRUST and REGULATORY STUDIES
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if those actions resulted in other negative effects on the market”35. Ultimately, 
the development of case-law attached greater emphasis to the former criterion 
of “harm felt by a wider number of market participants”, which excluded the 
application of the substantive provisions of Polish competition law in cases, where 
only one company or consumer was harmed or complained to the competition 
authority. The doctrine, which developed on the basis of this undertakings of the 
public interest, did not see every conduct that literally infringed the substantive 
provisions of the Act of 1990 as a restriction of competition and thus, mandating 
an intervention by the competition authority36. The conduct under examination 
had to make an impact on the competitive process37. This in turn makes it 
possible to suggest that it was not the purpose of the Act of 1990 to protect 
an individual undertaking against competition. Even though competition was 
viewed as the process of rivalry, a simple limitation of this rivalry was not 
considered as uncompetitive. Similarly, a violation of contractual obligations 
was not considered as uncompetitive – not every breach of contract results from 
a restrictive practice – and even if such a breach fitted into the definition of one 
of the restrictive practices stipulated in the Act of 1990, it was not prohibited 
because it did not infringe the public interest38. 
A rational need to separate trivial cases from important ones can help explain 
the fact that the public interest doctrine developed into the most important 
precondition for the application of the Act of 1990. Reference to this concept 
constituted an easy method for eliminating from the scope of scrutiny all those 
cases which harmed the economic interests of undertakings filing complaints to 
the competition authority. It allowed the competition authority and the courts 
to put aside cases without an appreciable restriction of competition as well as 
cases, where such a negative effect was highly unlikely to be established since 
the restraint in question was not a restriction of competition but merely an 
infringement of the economic interests of the applicant resulting from competition 
itself. For example, cases concerning increases in rent affecting business owners 
were dismissed as negatively affecting individual interests only39.
35  Judgment of the Antimonopoly Court of 29 December 1993, XVII Amr 42/93, (1994) 5 
Wokanda; judgment of the Supreme Court of 27 August 2003, I CKN 527/01, Lex No 137525.
36   Judgment of the Antimonopoly Court of 29 December 1993, XVII Amr 42/93, (1994) 
5 Wokanda, p. 56. Judgment of the Antimonopoly Court of 24 January 1991, XV Amr 8/90, 
(1992) 2 Wokanda.
37  Judgment of the Supreme Court of 29 May 2001, I CKN 1217/98, 2002 (1) Orzecznictwo 
Sądu Najwyższego – Izba Cywilna item 13.
38  Judgment of the Antimonopoly Court of 24 January 1991, XV Amr 8/90 (1992) 2 
Wokanda.
39  Judgment of the Antimonopoly Court of 29 December 1993., XVII Amr 42/93, (1994) 
5 Wokanda; judgment of the Antimonopoly Court of 24 January 1991 r., XV Amr 8/90, (1992) 
2 Wokanda.Vol. 2008, 1(1)
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Although the Act of 1990 was repealed in 2000, the public interest criterion 
has been interpreted in a similar manner in the Acts of 2000 and in the Act 
of 2007. However, an increasing number of cases can be found where the 
courts departed from the aforementioned approach to the pubic interested. 
The courts now seem to consider that the public interest is violated by 
any competition restricting practice, irrespective of the number of market 
participants that have been affected by it40. Pursuant to this growing body of 
case-law, a given conduct violates public interests if it restricts competition. 
One of the clearest examples of this development can be found in the judgment 
concerning the refusal by the Polish dominant incumbent telecoms operator 
to negotiate and sign interoperability agreements with independent dial-up 
internet providers41. The Antimonopoly Court ruled in this case that “the 
existence and development of competition on all relevant markets is in the 
public interest, thus any activity which restricts the creation or development 
of competition infringes the public interest”. A similar approach was adopted 
in a case, which concerned blocking telecoms access for foreign companies 
providing teletext services42, where the Antimonopoly Court ruled that the 
“elimination of foreign undertakings from the Polish market restricted 
competition and therefore infringed the public interest”. This approach has 
been supported by the Supreme Court for a notable time43. 
V. Goals of Polish competition law
1. Enhancing economic efficiency
The enhancement of economic efficiency has been advocated as at least 
one of the goals of competition law almost since the beginning of the history 
of modern Polish antitrust law. The fact was emphasised that the main goal of 
40  Judgment of the Supreme Court of 5 June 2008, III SK 40/07, not yet published.
41  Judgment of the Court of Competition and Consumer Protection of 21 March 2005, XVII 
Ama 16/04, published in: UOKiK Official Journal 2005, No 2, item 27.
42  Judgment of the Court of Competition and Consumer Protection of 18 December 2002, 
XVII Ama 19/2001, UOKiK Official Journal 2003, No 2, item 260.
43  Judgment of the Supreme Court of 26 February 2004, III SK 2/04, (2004) 4 Orzecznictwo 
Sądu Najwyższego – Izba Pracy, Ubezpieczeń Społecznych i Spraw Publicznych, item 343; judgment 
of the Supreme Court of 26 February 2004, III SK 1/04, (2004) 18 Orzecznictwo Sądu Najwyższego 
– Izba Pracy, Ubezpieczeń Społecznych i Spraw Publicznych, item 323; judgment of the Supreme 
Court of 12 May 2004, III SK 44/04, (2005) 9 Orzecznictwo Sądu Najwyższego – Izba Pracy, 
Ubezpieczeń Społecznych i Spraw Publicznych, item 136; judgment of the Supreme Court of 
5 June 2008, III SK 40/07, not yet published.YEARBOOK of ANTITRUST and REGULATORY STUDIES
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the Act of 1990 was to protect competition considered to be a mechanism for 
improving the effectiveness of the economy44. It was assumed that undertakings 
interested in maximising their profits must lower prices and introduce new 
products in order to attract consumers since otherwise, their customers would 
be taken by their competitors. Competition was seen as a force exercising 
pressure on existing market operators to improve their productive and dynamic 
efficiency45. Restrictions of competition were considered to lead to less efficient 
market operations – the main negative effect associated with monopolistic 
practices46. The main source of those practices was the “existence of economic 
structures abusing their market power”47. While the Act of 2000 was in force, 
some authors supported the thesis that allocative efficiency should be its only 
goal48. At the same time, other commentators advocated a more balanced 
approach declaring that the Act of 2000 was designed to protect competition as 
a mechanism that forms the cornerstone of the economy, while the protection 
of consumers and competitors should be taken into account only indirectly49. 
This position is compatible with the consumer welfare standard50 and the 
emphasis given to the impact of the conduct of an undertaking on the quality 
and price of its products51. The protection of competition, considered to be 
the mechanism facilitating the increase of efficiency as well as the source of 
progress and development, is deemed to be the purpose of the Act of 2007; 
the protection of consumers and undertaking against exploitative practices 
should be realised only indirectly52.
How did the competition authority and the courts respond to these 
suggestions? Even as early as the first half of the 1990s, the protection of the 
market was occasionally hailed as “the main goal of the act”53. This supported 
the thesis that an intervention by the competition authority was justified in 
44  T. Skoczny, Dostosowanie…, p. 144–145; T. Skoczny, Ustawy antymonopolowe krajów 
postsocjalistycznych, Warszawa 1992, p. 11; I. Wiszniewska: Granice…, p. 50.
45  S. Gronowski, Polskie prawo…, p. 21.
46  I. Wiszniewska, Granice…, p. 314.
47  P. Podrecki, Porozumienia monopolistyczne i ich cywilnoprawne skutki, Kraków 2000, p. 
14; S. Gronowski, Ustawa…, p. 5.
48  E. Kosiński, “Cele i instrumenty… “, p. 40–41.
49  R. Janusz, M. Sachajko, T. Skoczny, “Nowa ustawa o ochronie konkurencji i konsumentów” 
(2001) 3 Kwartalnik Prawa Publicznego 181.
50  A. Jurkowska, T. Skoczny, “Wyłączenie określonych porozumień specjalizacyjnych 
i badawczo-rozwojowych spod zakazu porozumień ograniczających konkurencję” (2003) 1 
Przegląd Prawa Handlowego 17.
51  P. Dębowski, “Wyłączenie określonych porozumień wertykalnych spod zakazu porozumień 
ograniczających konkurencję” (2003) 2 Przegląd Prawa Handlowego 7.
52  K. Kohutek, [in:] K. Kohutek, M. Sieradzka, Ustawa…, p. 42–43.
53  Judgment of the Antimonopoly Court of 3 August 1994, XVII Amr 15/94, (1995) 5 
Wokanda.Vol. 2008, 1(1)
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those instances, where the conduct under examination affected the allocative 
functions of the market. This opinion is strengthened by stressing that the 
protection of competition “consists of actions against abuses of market 
power”54 resulting from the exploitation of their market position55. 
The Antimonopoly Court often repealed decisions of the competition 
authority because they lacked a market power analysis (albeit understood 
not as a power over prices but as market share)56. Pursuant to this reasoning, 
undertakings without market power can not infringe competition rules by 
unilateral conduct. A market share of 7% did not support the assumption that 
the undertaking concerned had sufficient power57. In another case, the Court 
ruled that on the local market of commercial property, none of the undertakings 
had a dominant position because the scrutinised companies controlled only 20% 
of the market where 12 other entities were active. This meant that “a relatively 
small market share did not allow [the undertaking concerned] to unilaterally 
impose contractual terms irrespective of the conduct of other competitors or 
their customers”58. However, market power is still treated as equal to significant 
market share in the Acts of 2000 and the Act of 2007. Therefore, an agreement 
concerning the withdrawal of a certain type of product from the market was held 
to be anticompetitive because it made an impact on the whole petrol market 
seeing as it was concluded between both Polish oil companies59.
In a few recent decisions the competition authority emphasised that the 
rivalry between undertakings results in “optimal economic benefits from the 
sale of goods and services and maximum satisfaction of consumer needs at the 
lowest possible price”60. This shows a great respect for allocative efficiency. It 
also confirms that even though competition is still equated with rivalry among 
independent undertakings, competition law is concerned with the effects of 
such rivalry and not with the process itself. The fact that the competition 
authority did not mention efficiency concerns in a direct way in the past, does 
54  Ibidem.
55  Judgment of the Antimonopoly Court of 29 December 1993, XVII Amr 42/93, published 
in: (1994) 5 Wokanda.
56  Judgment of the Antimonopoly Court of 9 April 1997, XVII Ama 4/97, Lex 56458; judgment 
of the Antimonopoly Court of 21 January 1998, XVII Ama 55/97, (1999) 2 Wokanda.
57  Judgment of the Antimonopoly Court of 21 May 1993, XVII Ama 9/93, (1993) 12 
Wokanda.
58  Judgment of the Antimonopoly Court of 29 December 1993, XVII Amr 42/93, (1994) 
5 Wokanda.
59  Decision of the President of the UOKIK of 31 December 2007, DOK-99/2007.
60  Decision of the President of the UOKIK of 7 April 2008, DOK-1/2008; decision of the 
President of the UOKIK of 4 July 2008, DOK-3/2008; decision of the President of the UOKIK 
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not mean that they were irrelevant. The application of competition law to 
vertical restraints illustrates that fact best. 
As early as in the early 1990s, and contrary to the dominant trend in the 
Community at the time, the Polish Antimonopoly Court and the competi-
tion authority assessed vertical restraints in a fashion more similar to the 
approach employed in the US61. Market power was vied as the main crite-
rion for intra-brand restraints to be seen as anticompetitive62. Most of the 
cases that ended in a decision or a judgment declaring certain restraints as 
uncompetitive concerned distribution networks organised by dominant63 or 
monopolistic64 undertakings. In cases concerning companies with high market 
shares, vertical restraints were viewed as unreasonable restraints of competi-
tion65 that allowed the parties concerned to set prices at higher levels or delay 
their lowering66. In contrast, when the undertaking applying vertical restraints 
was not dominant, beneficial effects of vertical restraints for competition were 
emphasised, in particular, consumer benefits67. The courts took into account 
whether the result of the conduct improved consumer welfare thanks to better 
availability and the impact of vertical restraints on prices. Competition could 
be restricted only through market foreclosure. Market shares of around 30% 
were considered to be not high enough to foreclose a market, particularly if 
market pressure exercised by foreign imports was high68. As a result, verti-
cal restraints were held not to restrict competition per se. A full inquiry was 
necessary69.
The favourable treatment of vertical restraints adopted under the Act of 
1990 has continued seeing as the intervention of the competition authority 
under the Acts of 2000 and the Act of 2007 remained limited to vertical price 
61  I. Wiszniewska, Granice…, p. 83.
62  See P. Podrecki, Porozumienia monopolistyczne…, p. 140.
63  With market shares at 60% to 90% – judgment of the Antimonopoly Court of 21 July 
1992, XVII Amr 12/92, (1993) 1 Wokanda; judgment of the Antimonopoly Court of 6 December 
1993, XVII Amr 35/93, (1993) 7 Wokanda.
64  Judgment of the Antimonopoly Court of 6 December 1993, XVII Amr 35/93, (1993) 7 
Wokanda.
65  Judgment of the Antimonopoly Court of 21 July 1992, XVII Amr 12/92, (1993) 1 
Wokanda.
66  Judgment of the Antimonopoly Court of 6 December 1993, XVII Amr 35/93, (1993) 7 
Wokanda.
67  Judgment of the Antimonopoly Court of 8 January 1997, XVII Ama 65/96, 
unpublished.
68  Judgment of the Antimonopoly Court of 25 June 1997, XVII Ama 19/97, (1998) 7 
Wokanda.
69  Judgment of the Antimonopoly Court of 10 September 1992, XVII Amr 15/92, (1993) 2 
Wokanda; judgment of the Antimonopoly Court of 9 April 1997, XVII Ama 4/97, Lex 56458.Vol. 2008, 1(1)
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fixing70. Such contracts were held to be agreements that have the restriction 
of competition as their object because “the price set is set to the obvious 
detriment of the consumer”71. 
In cases where exclusivity clauses were examined, the competition authority 
emphasised that they did not restrict competition per se. Exclusivity clauses were 
said to restrict competition only in specific circumstances when they restrict 
market access or eliminate undertakings from the market72. In a particular 
case, an exclusive dealing clause affecting the yeast market, which was applied 
by a major producer, was considered as anticompetitive because the supplier 
controlled over 50% of the market. Other producers were therefore foreclosed 
from the market. However, the lack of a coherent approach to the goals of 
Polish competition law is shown perfectly by the, fact that the exclusivity clause 
was also declared to be anticompetitive since it “restricted the freedom of 
dealers and made it impossible for them to compete with other multi-brand 
dealers”. 
No restriction of competition was found in a case concerning an agreement 
between one of the major electric appliances producers and its largest dealer73. 
The competition authority found that this agreement was not discriminatory, 
even though it gave higher rebates to this particular dealer only, and ruled that 
it did not create different conditions for competition among the dealers of this 
supplier. Pursuant to the reasoning of the competition authority, the supplier 
was entitled to reward the largest and most active member of its distribution 
network. Rebates applied in this case did not foreclose access to the market 
for other producers. 
In another case74, the competition authority found no restriction of 
competition in the conduct of the major issuer of service vouchers who was 
accused of abusing its dominant position by selling vouchers at prices lower 
than their nominal value and by entering into exclusivity agreements with 
stores accepting those vouchers. Having analysed the market, the competition 
authority ruled that the number of outlets accepting these vouchers, was 
the decisive factor for the purchase rather than the amount of the discount 
offered. Agreements between stores and the issuers of vouchers were intended 
to “increase turnover and attract more customers”. Apart from that, the costs 
70  Decision of the President of the UOKIK of 7 April 2008, DOK-1/2008; decision of the 
President of the UOKIK of 18 September 2006, DOK–107/06.
71  Decision of the President of the UOKIK of 7 April 2008, DOK-1/2008; decision of the 
President of the UOKIK of 4 July 2008, DOK-3/2008 .
72  Decision of the President of the UOKIK of 29 December 2006, DOK-164/06.
73  Decision of the President of the UOKIK of 1 August 2006, DOK-87/2006.
74  Decision of the President of the UOKIK of 19 December 2006, DOK-158/06.YEARBOOK of ANTITRUST and REGULATORY STUDIES
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borne by the stores accepting the vouchers made them reluctant to accept 
vouchers originating from more than one source. 
The importance of efficiency was directly emphasised by the Supreme 
Court at least on a few occasions. The Court ruled that “an agreement 
between competitors organises the market in such a way that it sends false 
signals as to the price, demand, number of potential seller or producers” and 
under such circumstances, the market may no longer perform its functions 
normally75. Although those functions were not defined, reference to the way 
the market operates indicates that allocative efficiency is at least one of the 
goals of Polish antitrust law. In a case concerning interoperability agreements 
concluded with independent dial-up internet providers, the Supreme Court 
went even further by declaring that “the Act of 2000 aims at securing the 
existence of competition on the market as the optimal way of allocating 
resources among the members of the society”76. Pursuant to the reasoning of 
the Supreme Court, competition improves the efficiency of the whole economy 
because it forces undertakings to satisfy consumer needs and care for their 
interests by offering better products, additional services, new technologies, a 
competitive range of prices, etc. Thus, even though lawyers will always define 
competition as the rivalry between independent undertakings, competition 
law is not concerned as much about the rivalry itself as it is concerned about 
its effects. However, goals of competition law are not limited to enhancing 
efficiency only. Pursuant to the reasoning of the Supreme Court, competition 
is restricted if the conduct at stake leads to a decrease in production or sales, 
to higher prices as well as when it limits consumer choice77. While this opinion 
is in clear support of efficiency concerns, it is interesting to note that the 
Supreme Court defined consumer welfare quite differently to the Chicago-
school. Consumer welfare is not limited to the concept of total welfare of the 
society. The level of consumer choice plays an important role in qualifying 
a certain conduct as anticompetitive. However, the fact that a given practice 
depraved consumers of an offer that was previously available does no mean 
that it is illegal since it may be justified pursuant to domestic rules equivalent 
of Article 81(3) EC. Competition is desirable and worthy of protection as 
long as it brings benefits to consumers. As a result, a given practice may still 
be held as anticompetitive, even if it increases efficiency by lowering costs or 
improving productivity, if it lacks consumer benefits. 
75  Judgment of the Supreme Court of 12 May 2004, III SK 44/04, (2005) 9 Orzecznictwo 
Sądu Najwyższego – Izba Pracy, Ubezpieczeń Społecznych i Spraw Publicznych, item 136.
76  Judgment of the Supreme Court of 19 October 2006, III SK 15/06, (2007) 21–22 
Orzecznictwo Sądu Najwyższego – Izba Pracy, Ubezpieczeń Społecznych i Spraw Publicznych, item 
337.
77  Ibidem.Vol. 2008, 1(1)
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At this point in the article, it is possible to notice that so far production 
and dynamic efficiencies have not been mentioned. This does not mean that 
those types of efficiencies are irrelevant to Polish competition law. On the 
contrary, this fact shows that the polish competition authority does not get 
involved in practices that are either procompetitive per se or can be easily 
justified under the rule of reason analysis such as: R&D, joint-production 
or technology transfer agreements. Moreover, such agreements benefit 
from national group exemptions. That fact constitutes – at last – an obvious 
indication that enhancing efficiency is an important goal of Polish competition 
law that is recognised indirectly by the legislator78.
2. Consumer welfare and consumer detriment
All79 of the official titles of the statutes that form the foundation of the 
Polish competition law system directly referred to the protection of consumer 
interests; so did the preamble of the Act of 1990. The negative effects that 
anticompetitive practices can have in respect of consumers were also noted 
by the legal doctrine80. Reference to the protection of consumers was made in 
several of the aforementioned cases81 even though it was not of any practical 
importance there. In other cases, the protection of consumers was considered 
as a secondary (subsidiary) goal of Polish competition law82 since “only 
undistorted competition gives both undertakings and consumers a guarantee 
of their constitutional rights to economic freedom and protection of their 
rights”83. 
78  For a detailed study of block exemptions in force in Polish legal system see A. Jurkowska, 
T. Skoczny (eds), Wyłączenia grupowe spod zakazu porozumień ograniczających konkurencję we 
Wspólnocie Europejskiej i w Polsce, Warszawa 2008.
79  The title of the Act of 1990 was amended in 1995 by adding the phrase “and protection 
of competition”.
80  I. Wiszniewska, Granice…, p. 314.
81  Judgment of the Supreme Court of 24 July 2003, I CKN 496/01, UOKiK Official Journal 
2004, No 1, item 283; Judgment of the Supreme Court of 24 May 2004, III SK 41/04, (2005) 13 
Orzecznictwo Sądu Najwyższego – Izba Pracy, Ubezpieczeń Społecznych i Spraw Publicznych, item 
199; judgment of the Supreme Court of 10 May 2007 r., III SK 24/06, (2008) 9-10 Orzecznictwo 
Sądu Najwyższego – Izba Pracy, Ubezpieczeń Społecznych i Spraw Publicznych, item 152.
82  Judgment of the Court of Competition and Consumer Protection of 16 November 2005, 
XVII Ama 97/04, UOKiK Official Journal 2006, No 1, item 16.
83  Decision of the President of the UOKIK of 4 July 2008, DOK-3/2008; decision of the 
President of the UOKIK of 31 December 2007, DOK-99/2007; decision of the President of the 
UOKIK of 7 April 2008, DOK-1/2008; decision of the President of the UOKIK of 29 December 
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Nevertheless, direct references to consumer interests was made in a 
significant number of cases where a detriment to these interests led to the 
finding that the scrutinised conduct was seen as anticompetitive. In a recent 
case cornering an increase in connection charges applicable to international 
telecoms services provided by independent operators, the competition 
authority ruled that such an increase eliminated competition from independent 
providers since “rationally behaving consumers will not be interested in buying 
more expensive services of a similar quality”84. In another case, an agreement 
to cease production of a certain type of petrol was declared as anticompetitive 
because it “deprived consumers of the supply of a product that they were still 
interested in”85. In yet another case, the competition authority ruled that a 
practice of setting resale prices eliminated competition between DIY stores 
with negative effects felt mostly by consumers86.
This approach was also endorsed, at least in some cases, by the Antimonopoly 
Court which ruled that a restriction of competition may take the form of 
depriving consumer of the “option to freely choose the service provider”87. 
In another case, the Court ruled that uncertainty as to the potential reaction 
of competitors makes it difficult for companies to undertake actions to the 
detriment of consumers88. As a result, agreements which limit or eliminate 
such risk are restrictive of competition since they allow undertakings to exploit 
consumers. 
Pursuant to the case-law of the Supreme Court, practices that restrict the 
ability of consumers “to choose the type and standard as well as the price 
of the service”89 are seen as anticompetitive. The importance of consumer 
choice and consumer detriment was also emphasised in cases concerning 
horizontal price fixing90 and in relation to an agreement that contained 
exclusivity clauses, which was concluded between a motorway operator and 
towing companies91. 
Pursuant to this body of case-law, consumer welfare is understood as 
providing consumers with the widest possible choice of goods and services 
at the lowest possible prices and the highest possible quality. However, the 
84  Decision of the President of the UOKIK of 30 May 2006, DOK-53/06.
85  Decision of the President of the UOKIK of 31 December 2007, DOK-99/2007.
86  Decision of the President of the UOKIK of 18 September 2006, DOK–107/06.
87  Judgment of the Court of Competition and Consumer Protection of 18 December 2002, 
XVII Ama 19/2001, UOKiK Official Journal 2003, No 2, item 260.
88  Decision of the President of the UOKIK of 31 December 2007, DOK-99/2007.
89  Judgment of the Supreme Court of 12 May 2004, III SK 44/04, (2005) 9 Orzecznictwo 
Sądu Najwyższego – Izba Pracy, Ubezpieczeń Społecznych i Spraw Publicznych, item 136.
90   Judgment of the Supreme Court of 9 August 2006, III SK 6/06, UOKiK Official Journal 
2007, No 3, item 39.
91  Judgment of the Supreme Court of 25 April 2007, III SK 3/07, Lex 365055.Vol. 2008, 1(1)
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level of choice is as important as prices and quality92. If the conduct increases 
consumer choice, then it does not restrict competition. In contrast, if it limits 
consumer choice, it restricts competition and is acceptable only if it is justified 
in light of rules equivalent to Article 81(3) EC. Competition is protected 
because of the benefits it brings to the consumers93. If a certain conduct does 
not result in such benefits, then it may be considered anticompetitive.
The fact that consumer interests have been emphasised so widely and so 
frequently, does not lead to the application of Polish antitrust law in a consumer-
only oriented way departing from the reality in which markets operate. Not 
every decrease in consumer choice will be contrary to the Act. Predatory prices 
applied in order to eliminate competitors or deter potential market entry are 
prohibited irrespective of the fact that in a short term they bring benefits to 
consumers and are welcomed by them94. More importantly, the impact on 
consumer interests of a conduct reviewed by the competition authority or the 
courts has also been taken into account at the stage when a restrictive practice 
could be justified and escape the prohibition. It was established quite early 
on that the competition authority must asses whether an alleged restriction of 
competition was not in fact a conduct that better satisfied consumer needs95 
even though there is no direct reference to consumer interests in the provision 
imposing a ban on anticompetitive practices (Article 6 of the Act of 1990)96. 
As a result, undertakings could employ practices restricting the economic 
freedom of other market participants as long as they increased consumer 
welfare through better quality of services offered, among other things (eg. 
limitation of the number of garages, repairing cars insured by the dominant 
insurer, allowed the consumers to benefit from cash-free repair services, 
financed directly by the insurer)97.
The approach associated with the consumer detriment doctrine is also 
incoherent. On the one hand, the Court has declared that consumer interests 
will be secured under competitive market conditions. On the other hand, it 
maintained that competition exists only when consumes have a choice between 
different offers of varied, independent undertakings, irrespective of how much 
92  Judgment of the Supreme Court of 19 October 2006, III SK 15/06, (2007) 21-22 
Orzecznictwo Sądu Najwyższego – Izba Pracy, Ubezpieczeń Społecznych i Spraw Publicznych, 
item 337.
93  Judgment of the Supreme Court of 1 April 2004, III SK 24/04, (2005) 2 Orzecznictwo Sądu 
Najwyższego – Izba Pracy, Ubezpieczeń Społecznych i Spraw Publicznych, item 28.
94  Judgment of the Supreme Court of 14 September 2006, III SK 13/06, (2007) 17-18 Orzecz-
nictwo Sądu Najwyższego – Izba Pracy, Ubezpieczeń Społecznych i Spraw Publicznych, item 265.
95  Judgment of the Antimonopoly Court of 26 April 1995, XVII Amr 67/94, Lex 56343; 
judgment of the Antimonopoly Court of 15 March 1995, XVII Amr 66/94 (1996) 3 Wokanda.
96 
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would their welfare level improve should the number of market participants 
or their independence actually decrease98.
3. The lack of protection against unfair competition
The jurisprudence of the Antimonopoly Court clarified quite early one that 
the purpose of the Act of 1990 was not to protect business-owners against unfair 
competition99. No infringement of competition rules could be established if a 
business conduct had no impact on the competitive structure of the markets or 
the level of consumer choice. The Court’s ruling in another case was therefore 
correct in stating that one undertaking can exploit the difficult situation of 
another company, for example by imposing an exclusivity clause100, as long as 
such conduct does not result from the abuse of its market power. 
This approach is correct and supports the thesis that the protection of 
competitors against competition has not been considered as one of the 
goals of Polish competition law. Even if consumers were harmed by unfair 
commercial practices, this does not mean that competition as such has been 
restricted. The fact was also declared to be irrelevant that an undertaking 
loses its clients attracted to a competitor using unfair business methods. In 
fact, the claim that an act of unfair competition was committed is in reality 
indicative of the existence of competition in a given market. There is thus no 
need for the competition authority to intervene – it is up to the undertaking 
or undertakings suffering from unfair competition practices to seek damages 
before a general civil court.
4. The lack of consideration of non-economic arguments
Neither the subject matter of Polish competition law nor the wording of its 
substantive provisions support the consideration of non-economic arguments 
(unrelated to competition) when declaring a certain conduct as anticompetitive 
or when justifying it. 
It was declared only accidentally that the application of competition law 
in the public interest should be seen in a wider perspective and include such 
assessment of circumstances as the protests of farmers against the pricing 
policy of one of the undertakings, as an indication of a conduct violating 
 98  Judgment of the Court of Competition and Consumer Protection of 16 November 2005, 
XVII Ama 97/04, published in: UOKiK Official Journal 2006, No 1, item 16.
 99  Judgment of the Antimonopoly Court of 19 September 1991, XVII Amr 9/91.
100  Judgment of the Antimonopoly Court of 9 April 1997, XVII Ama 4/97, Lex 56458.Vol. 2008, 1(1)
CONTROLLED CHAOS WITH CONSUMER WELFARE AS THE WINNER…  53
the public interest101. Similarly, the Antimonopoly Court justified one of the 
restrictive practices adopted by the incumbent Polish telecoms operator seeing 
as it helped to improve network coverage, at a time when one had to wait up 
to several years for a phone line to be installed102.
5. Reasonable protection of economic and individual freedom
Initially, when the Act of 1990 was in force, Polish competition law was 
considered to be designed to protect the freedom of competition against its 
restraints resulting from the conduct of undertakings103. Competition was 
viewed as the process of rivalry and defined as a situation in which “markets 
remain open for all on equal terms”104. The freedom of economic activity was 
emphasised as was the freedom to contract, the freedom to choose customers 
and clients and the freedom to determine the content of the concluded 
agreements105. This traditional approach emphasising the importance of the 
freedom of competition and the freedom of economic activity can be noted 
even under the Act of 2000106.
This approach is supported by case-law where several references can 
be found declaring that the purpose of the Act of 1990 is to protect the 
“independence of market participants and their right to equal treatment”107. 
As a result, a restriction of this independence was deemed to be a restriction of 
competition108. The protection of independence was viewed as “counteracting 
the use of superior position by undertakings controlling a significant market 
share”109. Forcing dealers to undertake certain obligations under the threat of 
contract termination was held to be abusive110. The same applied to cases in 
101  Judgment of the Supreme Court of 27 August 2003, I CKN 527/01, Lex No 137525.
102  Judgment of the Antimonopoly Court of 25 January 1995, XVII Amr 51/94, (1995) 12 
Wokanda.
103  S. Gronowski, Ustawa…, p. 16; Z. Jurczyk, “Cele polityki…”, p. 36.
104  S. Gronowski, Ustawa…, p. 27.
105  S. Gronowski, Ustawa…, p. 25; P. Podrecki: Porozumienia monopolistyczne…, p. 14.
106  R. Molski, “Programy łagodnego traktowania – panaceum na praktyki kartelowe?” (2004) 
1 Kwartalnik Prawa publicznego 184-185; T. Szanciło, “Porozumienia ograniczające konkurencję” 
(2006) 8 Przegląd Prawa Handlowego 36.
107  Judgment of the Antimonopoly Court of 10 May 1993, XVII Amr 6/93, (1993) 9 Wokanda; 
judgment of the Antimonopoly Court of 21 May 1993, XVII Ama 9/93, (1993) 12 Wokanda.
108  Judgment of the Antimonopoly Court of 11 December 1996, XVII Ama 59/96, LEX 
no 56166.
109  Judgment of the Antimonopoly Court of 21 January 1994, XVII Amr 40/93, 
unpublished.
110  Judgment of the Supreme Court of 23 February 2006, III SK 6/05, (2007) 5-6 Orzecznictwo 
Sądu Najwyższego – Izba Pracy, Ubezpieczeń Społecznych i Spraw Publicznych, item 86.YEARBOOK of ANTITRUST and REGULATORY STUDIES
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which a dominant undertaking imposed certain methods of payment settling or 
imposed a duty to use services offered by a specific provider111. The restriction 
of competition found in those cases took the form of “depriving the members 
of the distribution network of the factual influence on the operation of their 
businesses”.
Even now competition is understood as the rivalry between independent 
undertakings seeking to obtain a market advantage over their competitors112. 
In order for competition to be undistorted, supply and demand forces must 
operate freely, that is, without any restraints113. Undertakings must therefore 
act independently. All concerted actions that are capable of limiting the 
economic freedom of market participants lead to a prohibited distortion of 
competition114. Any limitation of the independence of decision-making is 
considered to be an indicator of a restriction of competition115.
On the other hand, many cases suggest that a restriction imposed on the 
economic freedom of another undertaking was not anticompetitive as such; it 
was considered to be anticompetitive only if it resulted from a conduct “which 
had its origin in dominant market structures”116. 
6. The lack of protection for competitors
It has been established in this paper, when discussing the public interest 
doctrine and the enhancement of efficiency, that the protection of competitors is 
not an accepted goal of Polish competition law. Even in cases where references 
were made to the restriction of the economic freedom of other companies, the 
undertakings under consideration operated at a different level of the supply 
and demand chain – they were neither competitors of the entity resorting to 
the anticompetitive practice nor parties to the prohibited agreement. During 
a competition-related analysis in such cases, the most important factor to be 
taken into account is whether the scrutinised conduct does not discourage 
111  Judgment of the Supreme Court of 24 April 2003, I CKN 258/01, (2004) 7–8 Orzecznictwo 
Sądu Najwyższego – Izba Cywilna, item 115.
112  Decision of the President of UOKIK of 4 July 2008, DOK-3/2008; decision of the 
President of UOKIK of 29 December 2006, DOK-164/06.
113  Decision of the President of UOKIK of 31 December 2007, DOK-99/2007; decision of 
the President of UOKIK of 7 April 2008, DOK-1/2008.
114  Decision of the President of UOKIK of 7 April 2008, DOK-1/2008; decision of the 
President of UOKIK of 29 December 2006 r., DOK-164/06.
115  Judgment of the Supreme Court of 12 May 2004, III SK 44/04, (2005) 9 Orzecznictwo 
Sądu Najwyższego – Izba Pracy, Ubezpieczeń Społecznych i Spraw Publicznych, item 136.
116  Judgment of the Antimonopoly Court of 29 December 1993 r., XVII Amr 42/93, (1994) 5 
Wokanda; judgment of the Antimonopoly Court of 9 April 1997, XVII Ama 4/97, Lex 56458.Vol. 2008, 1(1)
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consumers from buying products of other non-dominant undertakings117. The 
interests of undertakings affected by exclusionary conduct are only secondary, 
as shown by the aforementioned case concerning the exclusive dealing clause 
used in the context of the yeast market. The clause applied by a company 
controlling over 50% of the yeast market was found to be anticompetitive 
because it affected consumer choice. Of secondary importance was the fact 
that it restricted the ability of undertakings bound by an exclusive dealing 
contract to compete with multi-brand dealers. 
Another example can be found in the case concerning the agreement to 
cease production of a certain type of petrol concluded between both Polish 
refiners. This practice was prohibited because it deprived undertakings 
operating at a wholesale level of the possibility to satisfy still existing consumer 
demand for this product118.
VI. Conclusions
Cases considered by the competition authority and courts, which have been 
discussed in this contribution illustrate the lack of a coherent approach to 
the goals of Polish competition law. However, despite the variety of existing 
opinions on this topic, the fact that the subject-matter of the statutes forming 
the core of the Polish competition law system is often mixed up with their 
function and goals, and that – if identified – the goals show an internal 
inconsistency in their reasoning (e.g. perfect and effective competition at the 
same time, economic freedom and efficiency, efficiency and consumer choice, 
etc.), the result ensuing from this disorderly and disorienting body of case-law 
seems surprisingly coherent. 
Non-dominant undertakings interested in enhancing their efficiency should 
not fear the competition authority as they can structure their agreements 
in such a manner as to fall within the scope of one of the existing national 
block exemptions. Even if they fail to do so, they can justify a restriction of 
competition resulting from co-operation by meeting the criteria contained in 
the Polish equivalent of Article 81(3) EC. Companies enjoying a dominant 
position are in a more difficult situation but even here an efficiency defense 
has not been ruled out. If a dominant firm can prove that consumer welfare 
will increase as a result of a conduct under review by the competition authority 
117  Judgment of the Court of Competition and Consumer Protection of 28 February 2008, 
XVII Ama 52/07, UOKiK Official Journal 2008, No 2, item 18.
118  Decision of the President of UOKIK of 31 December 2007, DOK-99/2007.YEARBOOK of ANTITRUST and REGULATORY STUDIES
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or courts, even dominant undertakings should be able to escape the prohibition 
contained in the national equivalent of Article 82 EC.
Nevertheless, all undertakings should consider the following questions: in 
what way does the conduct applied, or to be applied, affect consumers? Is it 
in any way beneficial to them? What are the benefits? Will consumers receive 
at least a share of the benefits resulting from conduct that may be doubtful in 
the eyes of the competition authority? Why is it so important? All this should 
be considered in the light of the fact that Polish competition law seems to be 
very consumer-oriented and generally follows the rule that “what is good for 
consumers, is good for competition”. This, of course, does not preclude other 
arguments to be considered but so far consumer welfare seems to be the one 
accepted most frequently. 
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